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PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
van den Bos, Lind / OWN VERSUS OTHERS’ TREATMENT
The Psychology of Own Versus Others’ Treatment:
Self-Oriented and Other-Oriented Effects
on Perceptions of Procedural Justice
Kees van den Bos
Free University Amsterdam
E. Allan Lind
Duke University
This article focuses on how people interpret their own versus oth-
ers’ treatment. Two experiments investigate how perceived proce-
dural justice is affected by procedures that are experienced per-
sonally versus those seen to have been experienced by others. The
studies show that, at least under some conditions, the treatment
of others is as potent a consideration in justice judgments as is
one’s own treatment. These findings are contrasted with previ-
ous insights into the psychology of social justice in general and
procedural justice in particular.
A persistent and important question in the psychology
of social justice concerns the reactions that people show
after having witnessed fair or unfair treatment. We start
from the premise that fair treatment and related justice
processes play a crucial role in various important
domains of social behavior. How people are treated—
especially whether they feel they have received proce-
dural justice—can exert strong effects on a variety of
beliefs, feelings, attitudes, and behaviors (see, e.g.,
Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Cropanzano &
Greenberg, 1997; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind,
1992). Folger (1984) has even argued that “the impor-
tance of justice cannot be overstated” (p. ix). Being
treated fairly typically leads to things such as higher com-
mitment to the organization or institution within which
the treatment is experienced, more prosocial citizenship
behavior (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998), and greater
acceptance of authorities (e.g., Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, &
De Vera Park, 1993). People who experience unfair
treatment, on the other hand, are more likely to leave
their jobs, show lower levels of commitment, and may
even start behaving in antinormative or illegal ways
(Greenberg, 1993; Tyler, 1990). Therefore, understand-
ing what leads people to believe a given procedure or
authority is just and fair is a key issue for understanding
some very important aspects of social behavior
(Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997; Folger & Cropanzano,
1998).
We hope to provide insight into the psychology of pro-
cedural justice by focusing on the extent to which peo-
ple’s perceptions of procedural fairness are affected by
whether they themselves or someone else experienced
fair or unfair procedures. In other words, we want to
explore self- and other-oriented effects on perceived
procedural justice. It is important to investigate self- and
other-oriented concerns in procedural justice because a
great deal of the information that one encounters about
the fairness of a given procedure or authority is not gath-
ered firsthand but is instead encountered in the form of
reports or observations of others’ treatment (Lind, Kray, &
Thompson, 1998). If we are to understand how people
generate fairness judgments, we must understand how
they integrate their own personal experiences with the
experiences of others. With the exception of a few very
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early studies of procedural fairness judgments and a few
very recent studies, most of the research literature on the
psychology of procedural fairness has focused on the
impact of personal experience on fairness judgments.
Thus, we have a very rich understanding of what it is that
makes people feel that their own treatment is fair or
unfair, but we know relatively little about what makes
them incorporate the treatment of others in their judg-
ments of overall fairness.
This in turn means that we are unable to answer some
of the most basic questions with respect to what is fair
from a psychological perspective. At the most basic level,
we do not know whether concerns about procedural jus-
tice, one of the most powerful dimensions of justice
judgments (Lind & Tyler, 1988), are primarily motivated
by egocentric or self-oriented considerations or whether
judgments of the fairness of process incorporate also
other-oriented considerations. This question—whether
justice is fundamentally egocentric—has stimulated
huge debates in various disciplines, although consistent
evidence on this issue is scarce. For example, some of the
pioneering studies by Thibaut and Walker (1975) explic-
itly addressed this issue by including not only recipients
of the procedure but also observers of the same proce-
dures in their experiments. Their work showed some
intriguing differences in the reactions of those who
experienced procedures and those who only watched
others experience the procedures: Participants in their
studies were more sensitive to nuances of procedure
than were observers, but observers did show differences
in their judgments of the fairness of procedures that they
did not experience (see, e.g., LaTour, 1978; Walker,
LaTour, Lind, & Thibaut, 1974; Walker, Lind, & Thibaut,
1979). Until very recently, however, few researchers pur-
sued this issue.
The recent studies that do look at this issue provide
contradictory results with respect to whether procedural
justice judgments are strongly affected by self-oriented
biases. For example, Huo (1999) found, when she asked
people to what extent persons from an outgroup deserve
fair treatment, that these judgments were not much
affected by whether the recipients belonged to an
outgroup whose norms and values were compatible with
or opposed to the norms and values of the respondents’
ingroup. Huo suggested that this seems to imply that
people feel everyone is entitled to fair procedure, but
she noted that future research should try to specify the
conditions under which social identity or group interests
have an effect on procedural entitlement beliefs. Simi-
larly, Messick (1999; Cates & Messick, 1996; Messick &
Sentis, 1979) has concluded that whereas reactions to
consequences (outcomes) tend to be egocentrically
biased, rules (e.g., procedures) are evaluated objectively.
These and other findings (for overviews, see Lind &
Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler & Lind, 1992)
suggest that reactions to procedures are affected by
other-oriented considerations; that is, procedural fair-
ness is not entirely or even largely egocentric. Research
on survivors’ justice judgments in corporate layoff situa-
tions shows that others’ experiences can have very sub-
stantial effects on one’s own evaluations of procedural
justice (e.g., Brockner & Greenberg, 1990; Brockner et al.,
1994; Skarlicki, Ellard, & Kelln, 1998; cf. Lerner &
Somers, 1992).
On the other hand, there is evidence in at least one
recent study of more self-oriented effects on perceptions
of procedural fairness. Lind et al. (1998) report an inves-
tigation of how group members combine their own
experiences with the reported experiences of others in
the group to form justice judgments. Lind et al. had
groups of three participants work separately on three
consecutive tasks and then meet to discuss and rate their
supervisor, who was supposedly another experimental
participant but who was in fact a confederate. In the
course of completing the three tasks, each participant
had three e-mail interactions with the supervisor, with
each experience either fair or unfair. The fair experi-
ence involved being allowed to voice concerns about
work resources and to provide information relevant to
one’s evaluation by the supervisor; the unfair experience
involved being denied voice on these issues. There were
two conditions in the experiment: Either all three partic-
ipants in the group were denied an opportunity to voice
their opinion in one of the three rounds (and were
allowed voice in the two other rounds) or one of the par-
ticipants was denied a voice in all three rounds and the
other two participants were allowed voice in all three
rounds. In both conditions, the same total amount of
unfair treatment occurred across the three-person
group, but there was a difference in the distribution of
unfair treatment: In the first condition, all three partici-
pants personally experienced mildly unfair treatment; in
the second condition, one participant experienced a
great deal of unfair treatment and the other two partici-
pants experienced no unfair treatment. Lind et al.
(1998) predicted and found that group consensus rat-
ings of the fairness of the supervisor were much more
negative in the first than in the second condition. This
suggests that mild personal experiences of injustice are a
more potent source of perceived justice than are reports
of more severe injustice experienced by others, a finding
that suggests a self-oriented bias in the interpretation of
justice experiences.
Examining the private responses of individual partici-
pants, Lind et al. (1998) found that there was evidence
that the unjust experiences of others were considered
and to a minor extent incorporated in the participants’
own justice judgments, but at the same time, the experi-
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ences of others were discounted, so that another’s strong
injustice had less impact than even a mild personally
experienced injustice. Lind et al. (1998) note that their
experiment was designed to begin the investigation of
self- versus other-oriented effects on procedural justice
judgments, and they admit that there are a number of
possible explanations for the discounting of others’
information that they observed. Of particular interest
for the experiments reported here, Lind et al. (1998)
note that the discounting of others’ fairness experiences
might not result from a self-interested ignoring of the
plight of others but instead from normal attributional
and cognitive discounting of reports that in fact might or
might not be accurate. In other words, it might have
been the case that had the participants experiencing
mild or no injustice learned more directly about the
experience of their badly treated colleagues, they would
have had no hesitancy in incorporating the other’s expe-
rience in their own assessments of justice.
In the two experiments reported below, the fair or
unfair treatment of another participant was conveyed
directly to the person making the fairness judgment so
that information on the other’s treatment was clear and
direct. On the basis of the above-presented line of rea-
soning, we argued that if the Lind et al. (1998) results
were due to attributional or communication issues, then
we should see strong effects for others’ treatment
because the fairness or unfairness of the procedure is
directly observable in our experiments. In contrast, if the
Lind et al. (1998) results are due to a more fundamental
self-oriented bias in incorporating others’ unfair treat-
ment into one’s own justice judgments, then we should
see weak or nonexistent effects for other’s treatment.
In each of the experiments reported here, we manip-
ulated the other’s treatment by giving the other either a
fair or an unfair procedure, and we manipulated the par-
ticipant’s own treatment using the same procedural vari-
ation. The two experiments differ in the particular pro-
cedural variation used: In Experiment 1, the procedure
involved either more or less accurate evaluation proce-
dures (cf. Vermunt, Wit, Van den Bos, & Lind, 1996); in
Experiment 2, the procedure involved the provision or
denial of voice (cf. Folger, 1977).
Each experiment also included a condition in which
the participant received information on the other’s pro-
cedure but did not know his or her own procedure. We
included this condition because we felt that there was
some likelihood that the impact of knowledge of others’
treatment would differ depending on whether one
knows which procedure one would receive oneself. Fair-
ness heuristic theory predicts that less relevant fairness
information is more likely to be used when more rele-
vant fairness information is not available (Van den Bos,
1999; see also Van den Bos, Lind, & Wilke, in press;
Van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998; Van den Bos, Wilke,
Lind, & Vermunt, 1998). Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt,
and Wilke (1997), for example, showed that when infor-
mation about outcome fairness is missing, people tend
to rely on procedural fairness information—as heuristic
substitutes—to assess how to judge their outcome. If this
process works across people, as well as across justice
dimensions, then information about another person’s
fair or unfair treatment should have more impact if one
does not yet know whether one’s own treatment will be
fair. We predicted, therefore, that when participants did
not know their own procedure, their reactions would be
strongly affected by others’ procedure.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants and design. Participants included 122 stu-
dents (56 men and 66 women) at Leiden University who
were paid for their participation (results reported here
were not affected by gender of participants and there-
fore gender effects will not be discussed). Participants
were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of the 3
(procedure experienced by participant: accurate vs.
inaccurate vs. not yet known)  2 (procedure experi-
enced by other: accurate vs. inaccurate) factorial design.
A minimum of 20 and a maximum of 21 participants
took part in each of the six conditions.
Experimental procedure. Participants were invited to the
laboratory to participate in a study on how people make
estimations. After arriving at the laboratory, participants
were led to separate cubicles, each of which contained a
computer with a monitor and a keyboard. Next to the
monitor, participants found a piece of paper and a pen-
cil. Participants were told that the computers were con-
nected to one another and that the experimenter could
communicate with them by means of the computer net-
work. The computers were used to present the stimulus
information and to collect data on the dependent vari-
ables and the manipulation checks.
Participants were first informed that they would be
participating in the experiment with another person,
referred to as the “Other.” The experimental procedure
was then outlined to the participants: After the experi-
mental tasks were explained, participants would practice
the tasks, after which time they would work on the tasks.
To increase participants’ motivation, and in correspon-
dence with Van den Bos, Lind, et al. (1997), participants
were informed that after all participants were run, a lot-
tery would be held among all participants. The winner of
this lottery would receive 100 Dutch guilders. (Actually,
after all participants had completed the experiment, the
100 Dutch guilders were randomly given to one partici-
pant; a procedure to which none of the participants
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objected after debriefing.) Participants were told that a
total of 200 lottery tickets would be divided among all
participants. Furthermore, participants were told that
after the work round, the experimenter would divide
some lottery tickets between them and the Other. Five
practice questions were posed to ensure comprehension
of the lottery. If participants gave a wrong answer to a
question, the correct answer was disclosed and main
characteristics of the lottery were repeated.
Participants were then told that they would perform a
work round in which they would complete an estimation
task consisting of 20 estimation items. After the estima-
tion items were explained, and before the work round
started, they would practice the estimation task in a prac-
tice round, also consisting of 20 estimation items. The
estimation items then were explained: For each estima-
tion item, a figure would be presented on the computer
screen. Participants were informed that each figure
would consist of 180 squares and that each square would
be either black or white. For each estimation item, a fig-
ure was presented for 5 seconds on the computer screen
and participants had to estimate the number of black
squares in the figure (cf. van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke,
1997).
After the estimation items were thoroughly explained
to the participants, they performed the practice round
(consisting of 20 estimation items). After the practice
round had ended, participants were told that the com-
puter program had calculated the deviation of their
answers from the true, objective amount of black squares
and were informed that an answer was graded as correct
when the answer did not deviate by more than 5 from the
actual number of black squares. The work round (con-
sisting of 20 estimation items) then began.
After the work round, the procedure that was applied
to the Other was manipulated. In the Other-accurate
condition, the experimenter communicated to the par-
ticipant, by means of the computer network, that the
experimenter had graded all 20 of the Other’s estima-
tion items in the evaluation process (in reality, however,
all stimulus information was preprogrammed). In the
Other-inaccurate condition, participants were told that
the experimenter had graded 1 of the 20 of the Other’s
estimation items.
The procedure that participants themselves received
was then manipulated. In the self-accurate condition,
participants were informed that the experimenter had
graded all 20 of their estimation items. Participants in
the self-inaccurate condition were told that the experi-
menter had graded 1 of their 20 estimation items. In the
procedure self-not-yet-known condition, participants
were informed that the experimenter had not decided
yet how many of their estimation items would be graded.
Participants were then asked questions pertaining to
the dependent variables and manipulation checks. All
ratings were made on 7-point scales. Procedural fairness
judgments were solicited by asking participants how fair
they judged the way in which they and the Other had
been treated (1 = very unfair, 7 = very fair). Procedural jus-
tice judgments were assessed by asking participants how
just they considered the way in which they and the Other
had been treated (1 = very unjust, 7 = very just). Procedure
happiness was measured by asking participants how
happy they were with the way they and the Other had
been treated (1 = very unhappy, 7 = very happy). These
three dependent variables were substantially correlated,
rs > .68, ps < .001, and were averaged to form a reliable
procedural judgments scale ( = .91). These measures,
asking for overall evaluations of the participant’s own
and the Other’s treatment, are similar to the overall fair-
ness of supervisor ratings used in the Lind et al. (1998)
experiment.
The manipulation of the procedure experienced by
participants themselves was checked by asking partici-
pants how many of their estimation items had been
graded (1 = very little, 4 = I do not know yet how many of my
estimation items will be graded, 7 = very many). A manipula-
tion check of the procedure of the Other asked the ques-
tion of how many of the Other’s estimation items had
been graded (1 = very little, 7 = very many).
Results
Manipulation checks. A 3  2 analysis of variance
(ANOVA) on the manipulation check of the procedure
of participants themselves yielded only a main effect of
self, F(2, 116) = 2,534.96, p < .001 (Other Fs < 1.40, ps >
.24). Results of a least significant difference test (p < .05)
showed that the mean answers were significantly higher
in the self-accurate conditions than in the self-not-yet-
known conditions and that these last means differed sig-
nificantly from the means in the self-inaccurate condi-
tions; other differences between the six conditions of
our 3  2 design were not significant. Inspection of the
means indicated that participants in the self-accurate
condition indicated that a very large number of their
items were graded (M = 7.0), that participants in the pro-
cedure self-not-yet-known condition indicated that they
did not know their procedure yet (M = 3.9), and that par-
ticipants in the self-inaccurate conditions indicated that
very few of their items were graded (M = 1.1).
A 3  2 ANOVA on the manipulation check of Other’s
procedure yielded only a main effect of Other, F(1, 116) =
2,264.47, p < .001 (Other Fs < 1). Participants in the
Other-accurate condition indicated that very many of
the Other’s items were graded (M = 6.7) and that partici-
pants in the Other-inaccurate condition indicated that
very few of the Other’s items were graded (M = 1.0). It
van den Bos, Lind / OWN VERSUS OTHERS’ TREATMENT 1327
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can be concluded that the independent variables were
induced as intended.
Procedural judgments. The means of the procedural
judgments scale of Experiment 1 are presented in the
upper parts of Table 1. A 3  2 ANOVA on the procedural
judgments scale (perceived fairness, justice, and happi-
ness) yielded main effects of the participants’ own proce-
dure, F(2, 116) = 5.81, p < .01, and the Other’s proce-
dure, F(1, 116) = 11.15, p < .01. These main effects were
qualified by a significant interaction effect, F(2, 116) =
19.17, p < .001.
To interpret these effects, we performed a least signif-
icant difference test for multiple comparisons between
means on the procedural judgments scale (p < .05).
Results of this test are presented in the upper parts of
Table 1. The findings can be summarized as follows:
When either the participant or the Other had received
unfair process, fairness ratings were very low; when both
the participant and the Other had received unfair treat-
ment, the fairness ratings were a bit higher, significantly
so in the comparison of the unfair Other/unfair self con-
dition to the unfair Other/fair self condition. Further-
more, highest ratings were found when both the partici-
pant and the Other had received fair treatment. In
addition, when the participant did not know his or her
procedure, the Others’ procedure did not have much
effect on overall fairness ratings.
Discussion
The findings of Experiment 1 provide evidence for
the proposition that people do consider the experiences
and treatment of others when they form judgments of
process fairness. Consider first the four cells in which the
participants knew both their own treatment and that of
the Other. Clearly, when the participants saw the Other
being given unfair process, they gave relatively low fair-
ness ratings, as they did when they received unfair pro-
cess themselves. The participants also seemed to be sen-
sitive to the unfairness implicit in unequal treatment,
because they tended to give even lower fairness ratings
when there was unequal treatment (i.e., in the unfair
self/fair Other cell and especially in the fair self/unfair
Other cell) than when everyone received unfair process.
The results when the participant did not know his or
her own procedure are more ambiguous, perhaps
because the situation itself is more ambiguous in these
cells. In contrast with fairness heuristic theory predic-
tions, there was no effect of the Other’s procedure when
the participant’s own procedure was not yet known. This
might be due to the nature of the procedure manipula-
tion: Perhaps the procedural variation used in Experi-
ment 1 (accurate vs. inaccurate evaluation procedures)
was not strong enough to yield the effects of the fairness
heuristic theory predicted in this condition. In Experi-
ment 2, therefore, we conducted a similar experiment
with a much more “sturdy” procedure manipulation, a
manipulation that past research (e.g., LaTour, 1978)
suggests is easily interpreted by observers: In Experi-
ment 2, we used variations in voice (the most widely
researched and arguably the most potent procedural
dimension; see, e.g., Folger, 1977; Lind & Tyler, 1988)
for our manipulations. We varied whether another par-
ticipant did or did not receive an opportunity for voice
(other-voice procedure vs. other-no-voice procedure)
and whether participants themselves received voice
(self-voice procedure), received no voice (self-no-voice
procedure), or were not yet informed whether they
would receive voice (procedure self-not-yet-known).
The main dependent variables were the same as in
Experiment 1.
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Participants and design. Participants consisted of 129
students (45 men and 84 women) at Leiden University
who were paid for their participation. Participants were
randomly assigned in a 3 (participant self: voice vs. no
voice vs. not yet known)  2 (procedure other partici-
pant: voice vs. no voice) factorial design. A minimum of
19 and a maximum of 23 participants took part in the six
conditions.
Experimental procedure. Participants were invited to the
laboratory to participate in a study on how people per-
form tasks. After arriving at the laboratory, participants
were led to separate cubicles, each of which contained a
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TABLE 1: Mean Procedural Judgments in Experiments 1 and 2 as a
Function of Procedure Participant Self and Procedure
Other Participant
Experiment 1
Procedure Participant Self
Procedure Other Participant Accurate Inaccurate Not Yet Known
Accurate 5.6a 3.1b, c 3.3b, c
Inaccurate 2.7c 3.7b 3.2b, c
Experiment 2
Procedure Participant Self
Procedure Other Participant Voice No Voice Not Yet Known
Voice 5.3a 3.3c 4.2b
No voice 3.0c 2.9c 2.7c
NOTE: For each experiment, means with no subscripts in common dif-
fer significantly, as indicated by least significant difference tests for
multiple comparisons between means (p < .05). Comparisons were
made only within each experiment, not across experiments.
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computer with a monitor and a keyboard. Participants
were told that the computers were interconnected and
that the experimenter could communicate with them by
means of the computer network. The computers were
used to present the stimulus information and to collect
data on the dependent variables and the manipulation
checks.
The experimental procedure was the same as in
Experiment 1, except for the below-mentioned points.
Participants were first informed that after the experi-
mental tasks were explained, they would practice the
tasks for 2 minutes, after which time they would work on
the tasks for 10 minutes. After this, participants were
informed about the lottery, which was similar to the lot-
tery of Experiment 1.
The task was explained to the participants. Figures
would be presented on the upper right part of the com-
puter screen. Each figure consisted of 36 squares, and
each square showed one of eight distinct patterns. On
the upper left side of the computer screen, one of the
eight patterns would be presented, and participants had
to count the number of squares with this pattern in the
figure on the right side of the screen. When participants
had indicated the correct number of patterns in the fig-
ure on the right side of the screen, another figure and
another pattern would be presented on the screen. In
both the practice round and the work round, the num-
ber of tasks that the participant had completed (i.e., the
number of figures that the participant had counted) in
the present round would be presented on the lower right
side of the screen. On the lower left side of the screen,
the time remaining in the present round was shown.
The practice round then began, after which the work
round began. After the work round had ended, partici-
pants were told how many tasks they had completed in
the work round; to try to ensure that participants com-
pared themselves with the Other, it was communicated
to the participant that the Other had completed an
equivalent number of tasks. To assess whether partici-
pants thought of the Other as a person who was compa-
rable in the amount of input he or she provided (cf. Van
den Bos, Lind, et al., 1997), participants were asked to
what extent the Other had performed well in the work
round relative to the performance of the participant self
(1 = much worse, 4 = equally, 7 = much better), to what extent
the Other did his or her best in the work round relative
to the participant self (1 = much worse, 4 = equally, 7 = much
better), and to what extent the Other was good in per-
forming the tasks in the work round relative to the partic-
ipant self (1 = much worse, 4 = equally, 7 = much better).
Participants were then told that the experimenter
would divide the lottery tickets between them and the
Other. After this, participants were asked to think for
1 minute about the percentage of lottery tickets that they
should receive relative to the Other and to write down this
percentage on the piece of paper next to the computer.
The procedure that was applied to the Other was then
manipulated. In the Other-voice condition, participants
were informed that the Other received an opportunity to
type in his or her opinion about the percentage of tickets
that he or she should receive relative to the participant.
In the Other-no-voice condition, participants were told
that the Other would not be allowed to type in his or her
opinion.
The procedure that participants themselves received
was then manipulated. In the self-voice condition, the
experimenter allegedly asked participants, by means of
the computer network, to type in their opinion about the
percentage of tickets that they should receive relative to
Other. (In reality, however, all stimulus information was
preprogrammed.) Participants in the self-no-voice con-
dition were informed that they would not be asked to
type their opinion about the percentage of tickets that
they should receive relative to the Other. In the own-
procedure-not-yet-known condition, participants were
informed that the experimenter had not decided yet
whether they should be allowed an opportunity to voice
their opinion.
The participants were then told that they had
received three lottery tickets (they were not informed
about the number of tickets the Other received). After
this, participants were asked questions pertaining to the
dependent variables and manipulation checks. All rat-
ings were made on 7-point scales. Procedural fairness
judgments were solicited by asking participants how fair
they judged the way in which they and the Other had
been treated (1 = very unfair, 7 = very fair). Procedural jus-
tice judgments were assessed by asking participants how
just they considered the way in which they and the Other
had been treated (1 = very unjust, 7 = very just). Procedure
happiness was measured by asking participants how
happy they were with the way they and the Other had
been treated (1 = very unhappy, 7 = very happy). These
three dependent variables were substantially correlated,
rs > .72, ps < .001, and were averaged to form a reliable
procedural judgments scale ( = .92). The manipulation
of the procedure of participants themselves was checked
by asking participants whether they received an opportu-
nity to voice their opinion about the percentage of tick-
ets that they should receive relative to the Other (1 = I did
not receive such an opportunity, 4 = I do not know yet whether I
will receive such an opportunity, 7 = I did receive such an oppor-
tunity). As a manipulation check of the procedure of the
Other, participants were asked whether the Other
received an opportunity to voice his or her opinion
about the percentage of tickets that the Other should
receive relative to participants themselves (1 = Other did
not receive such an opportunity, 4 = Other does not know yet
van den Bos, Lind / OWN VERSUS OTHERS’ TREATMENT 1329
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whether he or she receives such an opportunity, 7 = Other did
receive such an opportunity).
Results
Manipulation checks. A 3  2 ANOVA on the manipula-
tion check of the procedure of participants themselves
yielded only a main effect of self, F(2, 123) = 274.80, p <
.001 (Other Fs < 1). Results of a least significant differ-
ence test (p < .05) showed that the mean answers were
significantly higher in the voice conditions than in the
not-yet-known conditions and that these last means dif-
fered significantly from the means in the no-voice condi-
tions; other differences between the six conditions of
our 3  2 design were not significant. Inspection of the
means indicated that participants in the self-voice condi-
tion indicated that they received an opportunity to voice
their opinion (M = 6.9), that participants in the proce-
dure self-not-yet-known condition indicated that they
did not know their procedure yet (M = 3.9), and that
participants in the self-no-voice conditions indicated
that they did not receive a voice opportunity (M = 1.6).
A 3  2 ANOVA on the manipulation check of the
Other’s procedure yielded only a main effect of Other,
F(1, 123) = 981.32, p < .001 (Other Fs < 1). Participants in
the Other-voice condition indicated that the Other
received an opportunity to voice his or her opinion (M =
7.0) and that participants in the Other-no-voice condi-
tion indicated that the Other received no such opportu-
nity (M = 1.4). It can be concluded that the independent
variables were induced as intended.
Comparability measures. A 3  2 multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA) yielded no significant effects at
both the multivariate level and the univariate levels.
Inspection of the means indicated that our participants
thought that the other participant had performed
equally well in the work round (M = 4.0), had done
equally his or her best in the work round (M = 4.0), and
was equally good in performing the tasks (M = 4.0).
Thus, in correspondence with our previous work (e.g.,
Van den Bos, Lind, et al., 1997), we can conclude that the
participants thought of the other person as a compara-
ble person with respect to the tasks that were completed
in the experiment.
Percentage findings. A 3  2 ANOVA was performed on
the percentages of lottery tickets that participants
believed that they should get relative to the other partici-
pant and that they wrote down on the pieces of paper.
This ANOVA yielded no significant effects. The grand
mean percentage was 50.7% (the range of percentages
participants wrote down was 45% to 100%).
Participants who were allowed voice also typed in
their opinion about the percentage of tickets that they
should receive relative to the other participant. An
ANOVA indicated that independent of the procedure of
the other participant, participants typed in that the lot-
tery tickets should be divided equally between them-
selves and the other participant: Of the participants,
93% answered that they should get 50% of the tickets,
and the mean answer was 51.9% (the range of percent-
ages participants typed in was 50% to 95%). These find-
ings are supportive of equity theory: Participants pre-
ferred to divide outcomes equally between themselves
and the other participant (who contributed an equal
amount of inputs and who hence deserved—according
to equity theory—to receive the same amount of outputs
as the participants themselves).
Procedural judgments. The means of the procedural
judgments scale of Experiment 2 are presented in the
lower parts of Table 1. A 3  2 ANOVA on the procedural
judgments scale (perceived fairness, justice, and happi-
ness) yielded main effects of participants’ own proce-
dure, F(2, 123) = 7.91, p < .01, and other participant’s
procedure, F(1, 123) = 41.82, p < .001. These main effects
were qualified by a significant interaction effect, F(2,
123) = 6.32, p < .01.
To interpret these effects, we subsequently per-
formed a least significant difference test for multiple
comparisons between means on the procedural judg-
ments scale (p < .05). Results of this test are presented in
the lower part of Table 1. As in Experiment 1, when
either the participant or the Other had received unfair
process, fairness ratings were very low. Furthermore,
highest ratings again were found when both the partici-
pant and the Other had received fair treatment. In
Experiment 2, however, there was no indication that
unfair process to both participants was seen as being any
fairer than unfair process to either. More interesting, in
Experiment 2, the findings showed that participants who
were not yet informed about their own procedure were
significantly affected by the other participant’s proce-
dure: These participants reacted more positively toward
the dyad’s procedure when the other participant
received a voice opportunity than when the other partici-
pant received no such opportunity. It should be noted,
however, that the effect of the Other’s procedure was
weaker in this condition than in the own-voice
condition.
Discussion
In correspondence with Experiment 1, Experiment 2
revealed relatively strong other-oriented justice effects.
The Other-unfair/self-fair cell showed as strong a judg-
ment of procedural unfairness as did the self-unfair/
Other-fair cell. In that respect, the findings of Experi-
ment 2 replicated those of Experiment 1. Unlike Experi-
ment 1, however, Experiment 2 did not show the modest
enhancement of fairness in the condition where both
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the participant and the Other were treated unfairly, and
Experiment 2 did show an effect for the procedure given
to the Other in the conditions where the participants did
not know their own procedure.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
These two experiments do a good deal to advance our
understanding of how and when people use information
about the treatment of others to derive their own impres-
sions of the fairness of a procedure. In both experi-
ments, knowing that another research participant had
received an unfair procedure did as much to lower fair-
ness judgments as did receiving an unfair procedure
oneself. This finding can be contrasted with the finding
of the Lind et al. (1998) experiment, which showed
much more modest effects for the justice or injustice of
another’s procedural experience than for the justice or
injustice of one’s own procedural experience. Drawing
conclusions on the basis of comparisons between studies
is always problematic, of course, because we can only
speculate what caused the differences between Lind et al.’s
(1998) findings and the current findings. We suggest
here that the difference is due to the fact that in the Lind
et al. (1998) experiment, the Other’s injustice was re-
ported by the Other—the information was secondhand
and potentially biased—whereas in the studies described
here, the Other’s injustice was reported directly by the
experimenter. As Lind et al. (1998) noted, their results
could be explained by a discounting effect triggered by
the ambiguity of the target situation and the ambiguity
of the communication channel. We tried to make these
ambiguities less strong in our studies (and debriefing
interviews indicated that we were successful in this).
Given that our studies show strong Other-oriented
effects, this suggests that ambiguity moderates Other-ori-
ented effects. We hasten to note that because we did not
manipulate ambiguity in the current experiments,
future research is needed to manipulate and test the
effects of ambiguity on Other-oriented effects.
The present findings are important for at least three
reasons. The first reason is that procedural justice
research has focused on how people react to their own
treatment, but we know very little about how fairness
judgments are affected by social interactions. However, it
is likely that much of the information any individual per-
son has about fairness and treatment issues comes not
from personal experiences but instead from the broader
collective experience of other people. The studies pre-
sented in the current article help to fill this important
gap in the research literature.
The second reason is that the current studies extend
the previous lines of research on reactions to others’ pro-
cedural justice experiences in meaningful ways. The
studies we report fill an important gap in the study of
Other-oriented justice effects. We now have research
studies in three of the four cells of a Personal Involve-
ment  Direct/Indirect Information matrix. The
Thibaut and Walker studies (see LaTour, 1978; Thibaut &
Walker, 1975; Walker et al., 1979) explored the cell in
which one has no personal involvement with another
person’s procedure but does have direct information
about it. The Lind et al. (1998) study explored the cell
where one does have personal involvement with a proce-
dure but only indirect information about others’ process
and procedures. The current studies explore the cell
where one has both personal involvement and direct
information. The remaining cell, yet to be explored, is
the cell where one has no personal involvement and only
indirect information. It is reasonable to suppose that in
the real world, Other-oriented justice effects arise in all
of these contexts; therefore, the study of the psychology
of social justice needs to consider them all, and we hope
to have shown that the present studies take us one step
further in that direction.
The third reason we think the current studies are im-
portant is that we think this type of research can do a
great deal to deepen our understanding of the psychology
of self-serving biases in justice judgments (cf. Messick &
Sentis, 1979). As we noted at the outset, it is unclear
whether the greater impact for personally experienced
unfairness seen in studies such as that by Lind et al. (1998)
is due to motivational (self-serving or self-interested
biases) or informational (attributional) factors. Con-
trasting the present findings with those of the Lind et al.
(1998) study, we are prompted to advance the hypothesis
that certainty about whether a given procedure is fair or
unfair is more important than whether the procedure is
applied to oneself or another. Thus, if one experiences a
procedure that is ambiguous with respect to its fairness,
or if one experiences interpersonal treatment that seems
unfair but that might be deserved, there is the possibility
that the impact of these personal experiences on justice
judgments is discounted in the same way that the Lind
et al. (1998) participants discounted the justice experi-
ences of their teammates. If this is indeed the case, it
would give us a new, much more cognitive perspective on
the way experiences are integrated to form justice judg-
ments. Only future research in which the certainty or
interpretability of fairness-relevant experiences is
directly manipulated will tell us whether this suggestion
is valid.
One implication of our findings may be that we need
to direct our attention to some new theoretical issues. As
we noted earlier, notwithstanding exceptions such as the
studies by Lind et al. (1998), Brockner et al. (1994),
Skarlicki et al. (1998), and Lerner and Somers (1992),
the bulk of procedural justice research nowadays seems
to focus on individuals’ own experiences. For instance,
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researchers typically tend to measure how individual
employees react to their own experiences in corporate
reorganization processes (for overviews, see Lind &
Tyler, 1988). We hope that the current article points to
the importance of exploring how and when employees
pay attention to their coworkers’ treatment.
The findings of our studies with respect to the predic-
tions of fairness heuristic theory are less clear than those
with respect to self- versus Other-oriented justice effects.
There was little support for the theory’s prediction that
Other-oriented justice effects would be stronger when
the participant did not know what procedure he or she
would experience. In Experiment 1, there was no effect
of the Other’s procedure in the condition where the par-
ticipant did not yet know his or her own procedure; in
Experiment 2, there was an effect of the Other’s proce-
dure in this condition, but the effect was less strong than
the effect of the Other’s procedure in some of the other
conditions. These results do not support fairness heuris-
tic theory’s predictions. In our opinion, there are two
alternative conclusions that one might draw from these
findings.
On one hand, the current studies suggest a boundary
condition of fairness heuristic theory and the need to go
beyond the present form of the theory. It might be the
case, for example, that the tendency to seize on less rele-
vant fairness information when more relevant informa-
tion is not available for some reason does not apply to the
interpretation of Others’ fairness experiences. Thus,
there might be simply two independent justice interpre-
tation effects such that assessments of justice are influ-
enced by information about another’s treatment as a
function of how clear the information about the Other’s
treatment is, rather than as a function of how unclear the
existing information about one’s own treatment is. This
suggests that the processes fairness heuristic theory stip-
ulates work better across justice dimensions (cf. van den
Bos, 1999; van den Bos, Lind et al., 1997; van den Bos,
Wilke, & Lind, 1998; van den Bos, Wilke, Lind et al.,
1998) than across people. That would mean, of course,
that fairness heuristic theory in its current form is a more
limited explanation of fairness judgment processes than
we had thought.
On the other hand, far more studies have yielded
supportive evidence for fairness heuristic theory’s pre-
dictions (cf. van den Bos, 1999; Van den Bos, Lind et al.,
1997; van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998; van den Bos,
Wilke, Lind et al., 1998) than there are studies that
failed to support the theory. It may be premature, there-
fore, to conclude that the current findings revealed
definitive problems with the theory. Clearly, what is
needed are more studies examining this issue and
doing so with designs that allow tests of this potential
limitation.
Dependent variables in the experiments presented
here were closely related to the procedural judgments
reported in the Lind et al. (1998) study. In correspon-
dence with Lind et al. (1998) and various other justice
studies (for overviews, see Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler &
Lind, 1992), we assessed participants’ reactions by using
dependent measures that were tightly linked to our
manipulations of procedure (e.g., happiness with the
procedure and justice of the procedure). This makes
one wonder whether these dependent variables are too
cognitive or removed in terms of effects on affective
states. It should be noted, though, that we used experi-
mental paradigms that have shown affective effects in
other studies. van den Bos and Miedema (2000, Experi-
ment 3; see also van den Bos, 2000, Experiment 4), for
example, manipulated procedural accuracy, as we did in
Experiment 1, and found that this manipulation had
strong effects on participants’ positive and negative
affect ratings. These authors also reported experiments
comparable with Experiment 2 and found that voice ver-
sus no-voice manipulations can have substantial effects
on positive and negative affect states (see van den Bos,
2000, Experiments 1 and 3; van den Bos & Miedema,
2000, Experiments 1 and 2). Furthermore, note that the
dependent variables reported here included one affect
item (happiness with the procedure). Thus, although it
may be debated whether the measures we used tap affec-
tive states sufficiently, there is research evidence that the
paradigms and manipulations we used do affect this
dimension of human reactions to unfairness.
Along the same line, because we have used well-
known research paradigms here, we think there is a good
chance that the effects we report can be generalized to
contexts that matter to people. We know from debriefing
interviews in these experiments and in other studies
using similar methods that the participants took the
tasks and context seriously and were involved affectively.
More important, past research findings from experi-
ments comparable with studies presented here (e.g., van
den Bos, Lind et al., 1997; van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind,
1998) have been replicated in contexts that clearly mat-
ter to people and with independent and dependent vari-
able operationalizations that are less salient than those
used here (for details, see Skitka, 1998; Van den Bos, Van
Schie, & Colenberg, 2000). In addition, the present
experimental context is not too “obvious”; we know from
past research that in the experimental paradigms used
here, participants typically do not know what outcome to
expect (for details, see van den Bos, Lind et al., 1997; van
den Bos, Vermunt et al., 1997; van den Bos, Wilke, &
Lind, 1998). Thus, our educated guess is that the find-
ings reported here will generalize to contexts that matter
to people, that saliency of psychological concepts helps
but is not necessary to get the effects, and that people’s
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assumptions of what outcomes to expect will not explain
the effects.
At the end of the day, though, there is one finding of
these studies that promises to have enduring impor-
tance: Across both studies, we found Other-oriented jus-
tice effects that appear to be every bit as strong as were
our self-oriented justice effects. This finding stands in
sharp contrast to both the findings of the early Thibaut
and Walker (1975) studies and the findings of the Lind
et al. (1998) experiment, which suggested that seeing
others treated unfairly somehow did not matter as much
as being unfairly treated oneself. Although it may be the
case that we are sometimes insensitive to the injustices of
others in many real-world settings, the findings that are
reported here show that that insensitivity is not insur-
mountable. There do exist at least some situations in
which we can feel the pain of injustice as sharply when
others experience it as when we experience it ourselves.
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